Abstract
This book explores factors that explain the emergence and persistence of highly competitive and often democratic regimes in countries with weak democratic prerequisites. Focusing on regime transitions in the former Soviet Union, I argue that democratic and semi-democratic political competition has often been grounded less in well-designed institutions or emerging civil society, and much more in the failure of authoritarianism. In many cases, pluralism has persisted because autocrats have been too weak to steal elections, repress opposition, or keep allies in line – resulting in pluralism by default. Pluralism by default describes a range of democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes in which political competition survives not because leaders are especially democratic or because institutions or societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to impose authoritarian rule. In such cases, leaders lack the resources, authority or coordination to prevent today’s allies from becoming tomorrow’s challengers, control the legislature, impose censorship, manipulate elections, or use force against political opponents.