Collective demands for the constitutional accommodation of territorial cleavages are pervasive across very diverse contexts. In many countries, political identification on the basis of territory is a central basis of political mobilization, around which political claims are framed, political parties formed, elections contested, governments composed, and constitutional claims made and resisted. Constitutional transitions dealing with […]
Since 1996, Ukraine’s Constitution has provided for a semi-presidential form of government, but these constitutional arrangements have proved to be unstable. Over the past four decades, constitutional stability in Ukraine has faced four main challenges: (a) recurring institutional conflict among the president, legislature and government, which has stalemated the political system and prevented effective legislation; […]
By George Anderson & Sujit Choudhry This Working Paper presents a framework for considering constitutional transitions that involve significant territorial cleavages. It is designed to assist political leaders, citizens and advisers engaged in a process of constitutional transition where the territorial character and structure of the state is an issue alongside other constitutional questions. After briefly […]
Constitutional Transitions mobilized knowledge through an innovative clinical program at the New York University School of Law from Fall 2012 through Spring 2014 that provided “back office” research support to constitutional advisors in the field, and deployed faculty experts and field researchers for support on the ground — the Constitutional Transitions Clinic. We met field missions’ […]
Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa explores how decentralization in unitary countries can deepen democratic values, and improve the quality of life and human security in neglected communities. It addresses the benefits of decentralization to the MENA region and how constitutional incorporation of various principles can increase opportunities for decentralization and help […]
Oil and Natural Gas: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa, focuses on the relationship between oil and gas and constitutions. It addresses possible constitutional design options for the regulation of oil and gas resources to enhance accountability, transparency, fair distribution, and efficiency. This Report is a joint publication of Constitutional Transitions, International IDEA and the […]
Combating Corruption: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa, considers the constitutional frameworks and mechanisms available to prevent and reduce corruption, with particular reference to the Arab region. It argues that most successful anti-corruption frameworks combine a number of preventive, corrective and restorative safeguards, and adopt a coordinated, rather than piecemeal, approach to the problem […]
Semi-presidential government, if carefully designed, can act as a mechanism to promote power sharing and ensure that presidential dictatorship does not re-emerge in a post-authoritarian context. Semi-Presidentialism as Power Sharing: Constitutional reform after the Arab Spring analyzes a range of options for designing a semi-presidential system, considering the extent to which these options can ensure: (1) […]
A constitutional court may play an important role in consolidating democracy after a constitutional transition, and it is important for this reason that constitutional courts are independent, yet accountable institutions. Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment mechanisms and relative judicial independence investigates how constitutional court appointment procedures can promote both judicial independence and judicial […]
Political party finance law is the set of norms governing the income and expenses of political parties. Countries transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems often grapple with questions of how to regulate political party finance in a way that both ensures political parties can compete effectively for votes during elections, while limiting the improper influences […]
By Asanga Welikala Egypt’s political architecture under Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian leadership and the 1971 Constitution was characterized by weak legislatures and a strong executive. “The Legislature under the Egyptian Constitution of 2012” considers the constitutional arrangement for the form, powers and functions of Egypt’s legislature in the broader context of the framework of government established by […]
By Kent Roach Security sector reform is an important issue in post-authoritarian constitutional transitions, and it is an issue on the agenda in Tunisia’s constitutional transition. “Security Forces Reform for Tunisia” considers how constitutional rules and institutional design should govern the security sector in Tunisia, proposing a number of principles and constitutional mechanisms that should be […]
By Juanita Olaya and Karen Hussmann “Preventing and Combatting Corruption: Good Governance and Constitutional Law in Tunisia” approaches the pervasive problem of political corruption from the perspective of constitutional design, and considers how a constitution can set out principles, rights, institutions and mechanisms that prevent and combat corruption. The Working Paper uses the April 2013 draft […]
By Jörg Fedtke “Tunisian Constitutional Reform and Fundamental Rights” presents an analysis of the fundamental rights set out in the three drafts of the Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, as made public in August 2012, December 2012, and April 2013.
By Jörg Fedtke “Tunisian Constitutional Reform and Decentralization” is a commentary on the system of decentralized government set out in the draft Tunisian Constitution of 22 April 2013. The Working Paper investigates the fundamental objectives of Tunisian constitutional reform and assesses whether the system of decentralisation set out in the April 2013 draft Constitution is consistent […]
By Sujit Choudhry and Richard Stacey “Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia” conducts an extensive comparative analysis of the constitutional design options available within the semi-presidential form of government, offering comments on the April 2013 draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia in light of this analysis.
By Zaid Al-Ali and Michael Dafel “Egyptian Constitutional Reform and the Fight against Corruption” addresses the question of how a constitutional text can contribute to a commitment to prevent and eliminate corruption, investigating in particular the strengths and weaknesses of the 2012 Constitution, as compared to both the 1971 Constitution and Egypt’s experience under it and […]
After the uprisings of the Arab Spring that forced Hosni Mubarak from power in Egypt, a constituent assembly drafted a constitutional text to replace the 1971 Constitution. The constituent assembly approved this new constitutional text in November 2012, and following approval at popular referendum in December 2012, the 2012 Constitution went into effect on 26 […]
The Consolidating the Arab Spring Working Paper series was published in June 2013 by International IDEA, together with Constitutional Transitions, as a response to the imperative for targeted expertise in support of constitution building in the wake of the Arab Spring. Each paper addresses a specific question of constitutional design, such as the fight against corruption; semi-presidentialism; […]