Semi-presidential government, if carefully designed, can act as a mechanism to promote power sharing and ensure that presidential dictatorship does not re-emerge in a post-authoritarian context. Semi-Presidentialism as Power Sharing: Constitutional reform after the Arab Spring analyzes a range of options for designing a semi-presidential system, considering the extent to which these options can ensure: (1) limited presidential power, (2) an effective legislature capable of exercising oversight of the president and the government, (3) effective and meaningful power sharing between the prime minister and the president, and (4) presidential leadership in times of crisis.
This Report is a joint publication of Constitutional Transitions and International IDEA. It was prepared by the Constitutional Transitions Clinic as part of a series of reports:
- “Combating Corruption: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa“
- “Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment Mechanisms and Relative Judicial Independence”
- “Decentralization in Unitary States: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa”
- “Oil and Natural Gas: Constitutional Frameworks for the Middle East and North Africa”
- “Political Party Finance Regulation: Constitutional reform After the Arab Spring”
- “Semi-Presidentialism as Power Sharing: Constitutional reform After the Arab Spring”